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In this paper we show the relevance of the degree of competition for inferences about 
changes in export-production relative prices when the nominal exchange rate changes. We 
devise a model for tradable goods that combines the market competition and the pricing-to-
market literature and we empirically document the contrast between perfectly and 
imperfectly competitive markets for the export-production relative price responses to 
exchange rate changes. When the macroeconomic view is taken, a change in the degree of 
competition in exports (a change in the average mark-up on exported products) alternates the 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Drawing on the evidence on individual Czech exporting firms, the paper aims to empirically 
assess how relative export-production prices respond to changes in the nominal exchange rate and 
how this is related to the degree of competition prevailing in the particular market segment. 
The paper presents an estimation framework for testing the degree of competition and pricing-to-
market simultaneously. In the model, we investigate the degree of competition by means of the 
elasticity of an exporting firm’s revenues to costs and to the nominal exchange rate – an additional 
input price for export-oriented products. 
In the empirical analysis we use individual firm level data. We constructed a panel structure 
composed of information from quarterly financial statements of manufacturing firms which are 
located in the Czech Republic and which export. The analysis involves revenues, production 
costs, and employment costs, which are collected over 1993–2003 for nearly a hundred companies 
grouped into distinct industries according to their predominant manufactured product.  
Based on our estimates we find that firms that operate in a very competitive environment respond 
to nominal exchange rate changes with a smaller change in relative export-production prices (i.e., 
respond with quantities exported) than firms that have stronger market power. This is mainly due 
to the fact that firms operating in a less competitive market segment find it optimal to adjust their 
mark-ups when the nominal exchange rate changes. A firm that operates in a close to perfectly 
competitive market does not have this option and thus adjusts the quantity exported and keeps 
export-production prices unchanged. Empirically, close to perfect competition was found in the 
chemical and textile industries, for instance. On the other hand, the car and machinery industries 
were classified as imperfectly competitive markets.  
With a change in the degree of competition in the whole economy (due to different factors, 
although one of them may be appreciation of the domestic currency), a nominal exchange rate 
change of the same magnitude would generate a different reaction of prices and export quantities. 
Therefore, close scrutiny of the degree of competition in the export-oriented part of the economy 
might bring value added as regards accurately assessing the effects of the exchange rate on the 
economy. Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   3 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of the paper is to quantify the relation between the degree of competition in a particular 
industry and export-production relative price changes as a consequence of nominal exchange rate 
changes. In addition, focusing on industry level data by analyzing a panel of exporting firms 
allows us to establish a classification of the degree of competition, the magnitude of pricing-to-
market, and the type of products prevailing (different industries). 
The investigated relation is of great importance for practical policy implementation, as the degree 
of competition is directly influenced by persisting (trend) nominal exchange rate 
appreciation/depreciation. For instance, a trend appreciation of the domestic currency increases 
the perceived degree of competition for domestic exporting companies, since it lowers mark-ups 
from export markets. At the same time, the lower the size of the mark-up the higher the response 
as regards lowering the quantities exported, and the higher the impact on the trade balance in total. 
Therefore, the evidence on mark-ups and responses to the nominal exchange rate in exporting 
firms might contribute to more careful consideration of the exchange rate conditions represented 
in the overall monetary conditions of a central bank in a small open economy.   
At the same time, knowledge of the prevailing competition, seen from an industry-by-industry 
point of view, might be beneficial as regards assessing the structural changes that affect the 
product (industry) structure of the economy. Thus, one can then be more certain when assessing 
the change in the overall effect of nominal exchange rate changes (for instance an appreciation) 
on the economy over time. 
The literature devoted to the analysis of competition is quite extensive. The most common 
concept for classifying the degree of competition is the Rosse-Panzar model (Rosse and Panzar, 
1987), which involves estimating the reduced form revenue function and studies the size of the 
elasticity of revenues to unitary changes in all prices of input factors. The second and probably 
most commonly used concept is that of the Lerner index. At the core of this approach is direct 
mark-up evaluation, which can be performed in two ways, either through evaluation of marginal 
costs – estimating a cost function – or via an approximation using total revenues and total costs as 
in Domowitz (1986). Nevertheless, as Shaffer (1983) has shown, these two concepts are 
interrelated: the Lerner index is a transformation of the Rosse-Panzar statistic.  
The theoretical background and empirical documentation of pricing-to-market, i.e., in the 
Krugman (1987) sense the change in relative export-production prices when the exchange rate 
changes, is available. For instance Marston (1990), using the theory of the monopolistic firm (see 
Chamberlin, 1933), has shown exactly how pricing-to-market functions in a theoretical model and 
provides an application to a selected industry of machinery and electrical equipment. Many 
authors also document pricing-to-market behavior – see Knetter (1989, 1993), Goldberg and 
Knetter (1997), and Betts and Deveroux (2000). Since in these studies the authors explore pricing-
to-market in a selected industry, they do not establish the empirical link between the degree of 
competition and pricing-to-market (and the extent of pricing-to-market in the economy), since 
they analyze only some typical imperfect competitive industries, the car industry being a 
prominent example.  4   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková  
 
Although the type of product is not a prerequisite for imperfect competition, we try to discover the 
regularity in product markets (industries) characterized by imperfect or perfect competition. We 
develop a testing procedure for jointly estimating both the degree of competition and pricing-to-
market by industry, based on the lines of reasoning of Marston (1990) and the Rosse-Panzar 
model. In addition, we complement the analysis with an alternative method for classifying market 
competition (direct mark-up evaluation using total revenues and costs) and evaluating pricing-to-
market, for which we use the results derived in Cincibuch and Podpiera (2006).   
Our findings support the theory of pricing-to-market, although the degree varies with industry. 
Industries that are classified as being imperfectly competitive, such car or machinery manufacture, 
show a significantly lower response in export prices when the exchange rate changes than those 
with closer-to-perfect competition, such as the textile industry.  
Despite the fact that our analysis is limited to extracting mean estimates of the response of mark-
ups to exchange rate changes, it still bears an important policy implication. Since it has been 
shown that an imperfect competitor responds to an exchange rate appreciation by lowering its 
mark-up rather than losing export market share, this tendency tends to weaken as mark-ups 
decline under persistent (trend) nominal domestic currency appreciation (export market 
competition gets tougher with trend appreciation). Therefore, we suggest that a change in the 
exchange rate of the same size generates a different response in prices and the trade balance under 
a different state of market competition in exporting industries. We conclude that knowledge of 
market competition and its evolution over time is very important for an accordingly measured 
policy response. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Part two presents a model of a representative 
exporter and formulates the core tested hypothesis. Part three describes the empirical findings on 
pricing-to-market and competition. Part four concludes.  
2. A Model of Market-Competition Dependent Cross-Border Price Setting   
In the model, we consider a prototypal export company that produces one product variety and 
delivers to the local and foreign market. The company faces the respective (sufficiently narrowly 
defined – involving all close, albeit imperfect substitute products) residual demand functions in 
each market.  
In each market (local and foreign) there is a representative consumer having utility from 
consuming, u(.), the composite goods Q and Qf respectively. The composite goods Q and Qf 
represent the aggregate demand in the local and foreign markets for distinct substitute goods with 
a certain elasticity of substitution between products (on the domestic market ε > 1 and on the 
foreign market εf > 1, and both can vary with time and some other relevant variables). 
The residual demand for the product of a producer i is given by the results of the consumers’ 
maximization problem. The standard result implies that in the local market segment and in the 
foreign market segment the firm i (subscript i classifies the variable pertaining to a particular firm 
as well as to its product variety) faces: 
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The aggregate price indices on the local and foreign market in the respective currency are denoted 
by P and Pf, respectively. Thus the optimal quantities of goods supplied to the local and foreign 
markets by an exporting firm i are denoted by  i Q  and  i f Q , , respectively. The prices  i P  and  i f P ,  
refer to the prices of products sold in the domestic and foreign markets invoiced in the currency of 
the respective market. In the next subsection we describe the optimal decision of an exporting 
firm i, in which we follow to some extent the reasoning of Marston (1990).  
 
2.1 Exporting Firm’s Optimum  
The exporting firm maximizes its profit and thus solves: 
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where ff’(.) and f’(.) denote the first derivatives with respect to Qf,i and Q i, respectively. After 
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And the sizes of the mark-ups on the respective markets are as follows: 
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The above derivations imply that the price in the local market does not respond to nominal 
exchange rate changes directly. The response is intermediated through changes in demand for 
companies’ products in their market segment (elasticity of substitution) and changes in marginal 
cost. In contrast, export prices are, in addition to the intermediated effect through changes in 
demand and usual marginal costs, influenced directly by changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
Even more substantially, changes in the exchange rate are perceived by the firm as exogenous 
shocks to the marginal costs of exported products.  
Thus, similarly to Marston (1990), we see that relative prices on the two markets are linked by a 
common factor, i.e., the marginal cost. Therefore it is intuitive that as long as the mark-ups in both 
markets remain constant, the relative prices in the local and foreign markets expressed in a single 
currency do not change with any movement of the nominal exchange rate. It follows that changes 
in cross-border relative prices are facilitated by changes in mark-ups, although only in relation to 
nominal exchange rate changes and autonomous changes in the elasticity of demand in the 
respective country. 
2.2 Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices 
The size of the mark-ups as derived in (2.7) is, however, one of the measures of the degree of 
market competition; it is used, for instance, for the evaluation of the Lerner index. Thus, if the 
mark-up has changed as a result of a change in the nominal exchange rate, then the degree of 
competition has also changed in that market. Therefore, if the exchange rate changes, the 
exporting firm adjusts its mark-ups (because the elasticity of residual demand changes, which in 
fact changes the degree of competition). In this way the nominal exchange rate can be interpreted 
as an additional and specific marginal cost for products delivered to the foreign market.   
If we take the interpretation of nominal exchange rate changes as an additional marginal cost 
determining factor for products delivered to the foreign market, we can design an estimation 
procedure testing for the relation between the degree of competition and export-production 
relative prices, which is similar to the underlying idea of the competition classification of Rosse 
and Panzar (1987).  
The underlying idea is to estimate the elasticity of the reduced revenue function to changes in 
marginal costs. If there is unitary total sensitivity (the sum of the partial sensitivities) of revenues 
to changes in marginal costs, then the competition is nearly perfect. If the total sensitivity is, 
however, lower than unity (or negative), then we classify the prevailing competition as imperfect 
(or a monopoly).  
In our setup including the exchange rate as an additional input price, the focus is on both the sum 
of the elasticities to marginal costs except the nominal exchange rate, and the nominal exchange 
rate elasticity separately. In particular, if the sensitivity of revenues to changes in the nominal 
exchange rate is nil, then the competition is perfect in that market segment, since every change in 
the nominal exchange rate is translated into changes in price regardless of the changes in the 
quantity sold. This should be reflected in a unitary sum of the partial marginal cost elasticities. If 
the elasticity of revenues to the exchange rate is, however, greater than zero, then the quantity Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   7 
 
sold enters into consideration, which is typical for the price-setting behavior of an imperfect 
competitor.  
Let us define the total production of firm i as  i f i i Q Q Q , ˆ + = . Based on the optimal pricing rules 
in the respective markets, i.e. (2.6), the total price-marginal-cost margin is equal to the ratio of the 
price to the marginal cost:
1 
 






, ≡ ,  (2.8) 
 
where  ( ) i f i i i i c SP P P , , ) 1 ( α α − + =  and  i α  denotes the share of the total production of firm i 





i ˆ = α . In terms of average costs ACi – a common 
shortcut in the empirical literature (see, for instance, Domowitz, 1986) – we can write the price-
cost margin as:  
 






, ≡  (2.9) 
 
We henceforth use equation (2.9), since these concepts – in (2.8) and (2.9) – are interrelated and 
since the marginal cost estimation would require more subtle information about production, 
especially the quantities produced, which we do not have at our disposal.  
Nevertheless, controlling for the effect of costs on revenues, the exchange rate is an additional 
factor in an exporting firm which determines revenues and thus the price-cost margin. Writing the 
price-cost margin in percentage changes (log-differencing) and rearranging, we obtain: 
 
          ( ) η β , , , , s ac f p i i i c = ,      (2.10) 
 
where η denotes the i.i.d. disturbance term and βi denotes product (firm) specific autonomous 
changes in residual demand (autonomous change in mark-ups, i.e., the price to average cost 
margin). The relation (2.10) states that given average costs and an autonomous shift in residual 
demands (autonomous change in the elasticity of demands), the exchange rate is potentially a 
direct determinant of the cross-border relative prices of the same product. 
2.3 Estimated Equations  
Expressing equation (2.10) in linear form and in terms of revenues, which involves a linear 
transformation, i.e., adding the percentage changes in quantity qi,t to both sides of the equation 
and assuming perfect competition in the limit for now (β3 = 0), and grouping companies according 
to the industry classification, we get the estimation equation for companies in each of the analyzed 
industries: 
 
                                                           




1− ≡ , which is also known as the Lerner index. 
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     ( ) ( ) t t t i t i t i t i i t i t i c s q awc q acm q p η β β β β + + + + + + = + 3 , , 2 , , 1 , , ,    (2.11) 
 
where acmi,t denotes the log-differenced average costs of material, and awci,t denotes the log-
differenced average wage costs of the i-th firm at time t.  
By estimating equation (2.11) we obtain both the classification of the type of competition in a 
particular industry and the export-production relative price changes in the given industry when the 
nominal exchange rate changes. The former is determined by the sum of coefficients β1+ β2, while 
the second is given by the coefficient β3, which is the measure of the change in the cross-border 
relative prices of identical products when the exchange rate changes, thus corresponding to the 
notion of pricing-to-market (PTM) in the sense of Krugman (1986). 
Since the total average cost is homogenous in input prices of degree one, an increase of one 
percentage point in input prices results in a upward shift of the cost curves by the same percentage 
point. Consequently, the optimal quantity produced decreases, but by less than one percentage 
point (the extent depends on the shape of the curves). This implies an increase in revenues, as the 
optimal pricing rule dictates an increase in price in both markets. However, under lower quantities 
revenues increase by less than the initial percentage rise in total costs. This situation will reveal 
itself through the sum of the estimated coefficients: β1+ β2 ≤ 1.  
In fact, the sum of the coefficients resembles the Rosse-Panzar statistic (Panzar and Rosse, 1987), 
but it is not quite identical, since the independent variables are not prices of inputs but volumes of 
input costs. However, especially in the case of perfect competition, i.e. β1+  β2 = 1, our 
specification offers a similar testing hypothesis as the Rosse-Panzar model, thus we call the 
summation β1+ β2 the approximate R-P statistic. 
Under imperfect competition, the sum of the estimated coefficients β1 + β2 will not represent the 
correct sensitivity of relative prices to percentage changes in ACM and AWC ( β1*+β2*). This 
follows from the imposed restriction due to data limitation – only wage and material cost volumes 
are available. If we reject the restriction that β1 + β2 = 1, then we identify imperfect competition 
and the bias in the coefficient has the following structure, i.e. the true coefficient β1*+β2* (which is 










* 2 * 1 .     (2.12) 
 
The higher the market power (operating on the more elastic part of the demand curve), the lower 
the parameter θ, which represents the proportion of the change in revenues due to changes in 
quantity.  
However, when considering the optimal behavior, the summation of the coefficients β1, β2 and β3 
is likely to be close to unity, since even in the foreign market it must hold that a marginal increase 
in costs cannot generate a greater response in revenues than unity. Thus, exporting companies face 
nearly perfect competition due to the exchange rate (additional marginal cost) on the foreign 
market, unlike on the domestic market, where their market power remains preserved. Thus, we 
can derive the parameter that pertains only to acm and awc as follows: 
 Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   9 
 
3 * 2 * 1 1 β β β − = + .      (2.13) 
 
Similarly, if the coefficient β1+β2=1, then an increase in input prices translates directly into a rise 
in prices in both markets, as there is no space for price-cost margin alternation. The firm operates 
under perfect competition and thus the influence of the exchange rate is nil. There is already 
perfect competition on both markets and thus exchange rate changes are immediately translated 
into foreign price adjustment in the same proportion, i.e., there is no space for pricing-to-market. 
Therefore, the value of the parameter θ can in fact be inferred from the optimum, i.e., directly 









+ = .      (2.14) 
 
On the contrary, the estimate of the parameter β3 should always be unbiased and consistent with 
respect to the impact on relative prices. Since the coefficient directly relates the change in the 
exchange rate and the change in the composite price (the weighted export and domestic price of a 
product), and the domestic price changes with marginal costs as well as the foreign price, the 
parameter β3 represents the change in relative prices across markets expressed in one currency 
(provided the export share is constant or hovers near one half).  
 
In order to obtain the weighted aggregate effect of the nominal exchange rate on relative export-
production prices (see Table A-3 in the Appendix), we define an industry-specific nominal 
exchange rate, which is constructed as the export share of the industry multiplied by the change in 
the nominal exchange rate. It follows that: 
 
() ( ) t t i t i t i t i t i i t i t i c s q awc q acm q p η β β β β + + + + + + = + , 3 , , 2 , , 1 , , , ,   (2.15) 
 
where si,t = φist and φi is the export share of the industry i in the total exports of the economy. 
3 β is the weighted total response of the relative prices to the change in the nominal exchange rate. 
Equation (2.15) is estimated on a panel of all the companies in our sample. 
We neglected here the role of the change in the share of exported goods in produced goods in 
identifying the response of relative prices to exchange rate changes, as the empirical evidence on 
the share of exports across industries suggests slight fluctuations around fifty percent on average 
in our sample of companies. However, for the industry-specific estimations, where the shares 
occasionally differ from a half and fluctuate more substantially, the coefficient β3 (if different 
from zero) not only measures relative prices, but also includes the quantity adjustment.   
2.4 Alternative Measures of the Degree of Competition and Pricing-to-Market 
In our empirical investigation we chose to base the testing of the pricing-to-market hypothesis on 
a Rosse-Panzar type of model. This choice was determined by the fact that we lacked the physical 
quantity produced by each firm. Nevertheless, the Rosse-Panzar statistic has been shown in the 
literature to be related to the concept of the Lerner index, where the Lerner index is actually a 10   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková  
 
transformation of the Rosse-Panzar statistic (see Shaffer, 1983). Therefore, a compelling way to 
verify that our estimations of the approximate Rosse-Panzar statistic are correct is direct 
computation of the Lerner index (for a firm i) using total costs and revenues, i.e., the cost-price 
margin, as in Domowitz (1986): 
 
s Inventorie Sale
t Material Payroll s Inventorie Sale
CPM i ∆ +
− − ∆ +
≡
cos     (2.16) 
 
The ratio ranges from 0 to 1. Firms that are in perfect competition show ratios close to zero, while 
firms that are perfect monopolists show ratios close to 1. 
Thus, our prediction would be that perfectly competitive markets should show no changes in 
relative prices when the nominal exchange rate changes. On the other hand, imperfectly 
competitive markets should exhibit pricing-to-market behavior.  
Therefore, we should observe contemporaneously a high PCM, a high CPM (Lerner Index), the 
sum of parameters β1 +  β2 significantly below unity, and a high parameter β3 in the case of 
monopolistic competition, and, conversely, contemporaneously a low PCM, a low CPM (Lerner 
Index), the sum of parameters β1 + β2 equal to unity, and a statistically insignificant parameter β3 
in the case of perfect competition.  
In addition, an alternative measure of pricing-to-market would be based on disaggregated price 
indices as available in Cincibuch and Podpiera (2006), where changes in relative export and 
production prices are regressed on changes in the exchange rate. Therefore, as far as possible we 
provide a comparison with the statistics derived from price index data as well.  
3. Empirical Application to the Czech Republic 
In this section we present a case study on a panel of Czech exporting companies and test the 
hypothesis formulated in the preceding section. The conclusions are, however, probably 
extendable to other converging, transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
3.1 Data Description 
Focusing on the effects of the nominal exchange rate on the prices of the sold products of a firm 
in different markets, we constructed a panel data structure that is composed of individual 
manufacturing firms which are located in the Czech Republic and which export. The data source 
was the Magnus database, which continuously provides quarterly financial statements for Czech 
companies from 1993 onwards.  
Information on the share of exports, which is the selection criterion for our sample of companies, 
is, however, not available for all the firms listed in the database. Nevertheless, it is occasionally 
published in the press, and the Magnus database provides media monitoring. The media has been 
monitored since 2000 and information about export percentages is available for 443 
manufacturing firms. Nevertheless, we could not use all of these firms, for the reasons described 
below. Data on the financial indicators of companies selected in this way are sometimes gathered Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   11 
 
by the Magnus database in a difficult way. Unfortunately the data set from 2004 onwards is very 
scarce, so we were forced to restrict our sample to 2003. 
Thus, we downloaded all accessible quarterly financial statements for the period 1993–2003. We 
excluded those firms whose financial statements were not accessible as well as observations that 
did not have complete records on a set of accounting variables such as production (revenues), 
production costs, and employment costs (payroll), since we use these variables in the regressions. 
Since the “profit and loss statement” is a cumulative statement (for the second, third, and fourth 
quarters), we had to subtract the third quarter from the fourth, the second quarter from the third, 
and the first quarter from the second, in order to explore the effect of the exchange rate in 
particular quarters. For that we needed two consecutive financial statements, hence we excluded 
non-consecutive observations.  
We ended up with a sample of 94 exporting companies operating in the Czech Republic whose 
main activities involve manufacturing (according to the Czech classification of activities 
“OKEČ”; see Table A-2 in the Appendix) and for which we obtained information about their 
share of exports and for which at least two continuous quarterly observations during the period 
1993–2003 were available (for the list of companies, see Table A-1 in the Appendix). We 
obtained an unbalanced panel data set with 1 447 quarterly observations for 94 firms for the 
period 1993–2003. The panel is unbalanced in the sense that we have more observations for some 
firms than for others and that these observations correspond to different time spans. However, as 
the statistics in the following Table 1 show, the observations per company and year are quite 
uniform.  
Table 1: Data Descriptive Statistics 
      Mean  Std. dev.  Max.  Min. 
Number of observations per quarter  35 9  51  15 
Number of obs. per company     16  11  44  2 
Exchange rate (CZK/EUR)     34.18  1.98  37.76  30.25 
Personnel costs  overall 72.2 169.7  2  119.7  2.9 
(CZK millions)  between   232.4  1 986.7  4.1 
   within    19.8  434.1  -115.6 
Production costs  overall  405.6  2 219.2  33 200  4.3 
(CZK millions)  between   3 157  30 000  7.4 
   within    160.7  3 586.6  -1 835.5 
Revenues  overall 536.2  2  581.9  390  000  7.4 
(CZK millions)  between   3 659.9  34 600  17.1 
   within    227.2  4 947  -2 933 
Note: The statistics encompass the entire period 1993–2003. The minimum and maximum statistics 
represent the extreme deviations from the firm’s mean. The CZK/EUR exchange rate prior to 
1999 was based on CZK/DEM.  
 
As we can also see from Table 1, the average revenues across companies are CZK 536 million 
(Czech koruna) and production costs have the highest share of total costs (around 76%). 
As the standard deviations suggest, the costs and revenues varied substantially across companies 
and across time. The differences between the minima and maxima are very high – in the 
observation period personnel costs varied between CZK  2.9  million and CZK  2  billion, 
production costs between CZK  4.3  million and CZK  33  billion, and revenues between 12   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková  
 
CZK 7.4 million and CZK 39 billion. Naturally, the car producer Škoda Auto is behind the largest 
numbers.  
The “within” standard deviations indicate how volatile the variables are within one company over 
time. They suggest that production costs, revenues and even personnel costs were reasonably 
volatile within firms. Intuitively, the variation within companies is only a fraction of the variation 
across companies.  
3.2 Estimation Results on Pricing-to-Market 
The results of the estimated relations comprise a set of industry-by-industry regressions as well as 
a “weighted” regression, where the weights are on the exchange rate and reflect the share of 
exports of the industry in total exports by the entire manufacturing sector.  
The industry estimations of PTM (in the sense of changes in relative export-production prices) are 
displayed in Table 2. Table 2 presents the results for the fixed effects model applied to each 
industry defined by the OKEČ classification; hence the intercept β0   represents the average over 
the company-specific fixed effects in the particular industry. 
Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimation Results – Industry eq. (2.10) and Weighted eq. (2.14)   
Industry Beer Textiles  Paper  Chemicals Glass Metals Fitting  Machines Cars Weighted 
OKEČ  15 17,18  20,21,22  24,25  26 27,28 29  31,32,33  34  PTM 
β1  0.922*** 0.822*** 0.796***  0.957***  0.702*** 0.913*** 0.700*** 0.780*** 0.712***  0.888*** 
   (0.050) (0.029) (0.053)  (0.036)  (0.078) (0.044) (0.029) (0.051) (0.089)  (0.014) 
β2  0.036 0.158*** 0.021  0.045  0.362*** 0.042 0.245*** 0.073  0.144** 0.100*** 
   (0.096) (0.033) (0.036)  (0.042)  (0.091) (0.052) (0.046) (0.054) (0.073)  (0.015) 
β3  0.241 0.216***  0.550*** 0.149*  0.087  0.264** 0.367*** 0.607*** 0.700*** 0.455*** 
   (0.159) (0.074) (0.103)  (0.087)  (0.146) (0.116) (0.111) (0.125) (0.209)  (0.052) 
β0  -0.008 0.083  0.634***  -0.127**  -0.191* 0.007  0.046  0.102  0.076 0.152*** 
   (0.465) (0.072) (0.215)  (0.054)  (0.103) (0.134) (0.106) (0.115) (0.153)  (0.031) 
LBI  1.954 1.741 1.799  1.691  1.785 1.885 1.710 1.899 1.934  1.670 
BH.-DW  1.791 1.522 1.473  1.384  1.209 1.712 1.436 1.493 1.617  1.381 
ρ  0.122 0.261 0.273  0.347  0.413 0.170 0.287 0.279 0.316  0.333 
s_u  0.146 0.089 0.199  0.158  0.094 0.096 0.080 0.119 0.308  0.289 
s_e  0.094 0.076 0.111  0.097  0.096 0.088 0.121 0.094 0.109  0.109 
export  0.13 0.72 0.43  0.51  0.68 0.49 0.68 0.62 0.53    0.53 
obs.  46 300  101 239  93 145  371 93  59 1447 
firms  3 15 6  18  7 13  20 6  6  94 
R2-all  0.989 0.967 0.982  0.989  0.987 0.994 0.965 0.938 0.996  0.944 
R2-
within  0.958 0.984 0.956  0.992  0.985 0.981 0.953 0.987 0.987  0.982 
R2-
between  0.999 0.981 0.994  0.994  0.995 0.997 0.987 0.957 0.998  0.949 
P-value
a)  0.0260 0.0000 0.0062  0.0000  0.0012 0.0044 0.0000 0.0001 0.0191  0.000 
Note: Standard errors are given in parenthesis; asterisks denote significance as follows: *** 1%,   
** 5%, and * 10%.  
 a) Probability of rejecting the existence of a regression relation (F-test). 
  
As we can see from Table 2, the majority of the estimated elasticities of relative prices to 
exchange rate changes β3  (measuring pricing-to-market) are significant and lower than unity. The 
size of the elasticity is negatively correlated with the degree of competition (measured by the 
summation of the coefficients on material and personnel costs, i.e., the approximate Rosse-Panzar Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   13 
 
statistic), thus confirming the hypothesis that pricing-to-market appears in the market of imperfect 
competition.  
Turning to the diagnostic statistics of the estimates, the residuals do not exhibit significant serial 
correlation (based on LBI statistics and BH-DW statistics) and the share of the explained variance 
is relatively high in all dimensions (cross-section, time series as well as overall). Since the 
estimation is in fact based on variations in the mark-ups, which are stationary over time, panel 
cointegration methods do not need to be used. Some complementary statistics are given as well, 
for instance the number of firms in our sample per industry, and export, denoting the share of 
exports of production in the industry. 
The ‘weighted’ PTM measure has been estimated as a weighted regression, where weights (the 
share of exports in the industry in total manufacturing exports – see Table A-3 in the Appendix) 
have been applied to the exchange rate for different industries. The results can be found in the 
column  Weighted PTM in Table 2. Although the pricing-to-market measured in the different 
industries may be affected to some extent by the variable average export share of the industry in 
our sample, the aggregated PTM should remain unaffected due to the stable export share at the 
level of the manufacturing sector, which basically fluctuated moderately around fifty per cent over 
our sample period. The size of the weighted PTM of 0.455 suggests that each percentage change 
in the nominal exchange rate (say, an appreciation of the local currency, i.e. CZK/EUR, by 1 
percent) would transmit into price differences of Czech production across markets of roughly half 
a percentage point. 
The interpretation of the approximate Rosse-Panzar statistic in the aggregate PTM regression is 
somewhat more complicated. In the regression, the weights were applied only to the exchange 
rate. Therefore, the labor cost and production cost elasticity cannot be directly interpreted. With 
the use of (2.13) we derive the Rosse-Panzar statistic to be equal to 0.545. This statistic classifies 
the internal market overall as monopolistic competition. Nevertheless, there appear to be quite 
large differences in the degree of competition at the level of particular industries. Some markets 
were identified as close to perfect competition, such as Chemicals, whereas some were classified 
as monopolistic competition, for instance Cars and Machines. 
3.3 Degree of Competition and Pricing-to-Market: A Comparison 
Our results, presented in Table 3, confirm that industries with approximate Rosse-Panzar elasticity 
close to 1, which indicates conditions close to perfect competition, have a low price-cost margin 
and individual industry Lerner index, and a statistically insignificant or very low parameter β3. 
This implies that, in these highly competitive industries, cross-border relative prices do respond 
less to nominal exchange rate changes than in less competitive industries.  
Conversely, though, where the approximate Rosse-Panzar elasticity is significantly below unity, 
we observe a high price-cost margin and individual industry Lerner index, and a high parameter 
β3. Thus, these industries exhibit imperfect competition and significant pricing-to-market. Thus 
our findings from the regression (2.11 and 2.15) are confirmed by the direct market competition 
evaluation via the Lerner index, computed according to (2.16). 
 14   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková  
 
Table 3: Market Competition and Pricing-to-Market Measures 
Industry  OKEČ  PTM, i.e. β3   PTM  





Beer  15 0.241  (0.159)  -      0.143  1.187  0.958  [0.759] 
Textiles  17,18 0.216***  (0.074)  0.242  (0.074) 0.118  1.146  0.980  [0.784***] 
Paper  20,21,22 0.550*** (0.103) 0.296 (0.119) 0.137  1.181  0.817  [0.450***] 
Chemicals  24,25 0.149*  (0.087)  0.483  (0.156) 0.108  1.135  1.002  [0.851*] 
Glass  26 0.087  (0.146)  -      0.160  1.214  1.064  [0.913] 
Metals  27,28 0.264**  (0.116)  0.157  (0.136) 0.078  1.096  0.955  [0.736**] 
Fitting  29 0.367***  (0.111)  -      0.099  1.132  0.945  [0.633***] 
Machines  31,32,33 0.607*** (0.125) 0.477 (0.102) 0.162  1.219  0.853  [0.393***] 
Cars  34 0.700***  (0.209)  0.659  (0.111) 0.182  1.253  0.856  [0.300***] 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. The change in relative prices (export vs. production prices) 
PTM C&P (2006) was derived using price indices published in Cincibuch and Podpiera (2006), 
Table 3. The computation of the cost-price margin (profit margin) is derived as in Domowitz et 
al. (1989), which is an approximation of the Lerner index: 
s Inventorie Sale
t Material Payroll s Inventorie Sale
CPM
∆ +
− − ∆ +
≡







1 . The approximate Rosse-Panzar statistic is computed as β1 + β2, and β1* + β2* is 




The relations between pricing-to-market and the different measures of market structure are 
represented visually in Figure 1. The data show an apparent relation between the measures of 
competition and pricing-to-market, telling a consistent story about the impact of exchange rate 
changes on relative prices under different prevailing market competition.  
The relation between the approximate Rosse-Panzar statistics and the estimated pricing-to-market 
across industries is apparently linear and negative, which means that high pricing-to-market is 
connected with imperfectly competitive markets. The evidence from the cost-price margin and the 
price-cost margin (the one being an affine transformation of the other) is such that imperfect 
competition (high values of both) positively correlates with a high parameter estimate of pricing-
to-market. And finally, comparing the estimated pricing-to-market from company data with the 
pricing-to-market estimates from price index data (export price index over domestic production 
price index) as derived by Cincibuch and Podpiera (2006), we can conclude that the two measures 
correlate very well (data points are featured in Table 3). An apparent relation is also seen between 
the estimate of the approximate Rosse-Panzar statistics and the directly evaluated cost-price 
margin (Lerner index), which confirms the reliability of the estimated values classifying market 
competition.  
 Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   15 
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Note: The marked trend is the linear trend.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we study the role of market competition in the strength of the response of relative 
export-production prices to changes in the nominal exchange rate, i.e., pricing-to-market. We 
devise a theoretical base for empirical testing of the relation between the degree of competition 
and the response in relative prices across markets to exchange rate changes, which we apply to 
exporting companies in manufacturing industries in the Czech Republic during 1993–2003.    
We document a strong link between the degree of competition and pricing-to-market. Namely, in 
those industries classified as having close to perfect competition, we find virtually no pricing-to-
market behavior, i.e., no changes in export-production relative prices when the nominal exchange 
rate changes. On the contrary, in industries which distinguishably exhibit imperfect competition, 
we observed strong responses in relative prices to exchange rate changes. We verified our 
findings by means of alternative measurement of pricing-to-market and the degree of competition, 
such as evidence on pricing-to-market from export and production price indices and direct cost-
price margin evaluation.  16   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková  
 
Our finding might possibly have an important policy implication. Namely, in the case of a 
tendency of increasing export market competition (for instance due to a trend nominal domestic 
currency appreciation), the prevailing market competition in an economy would approach perfect 
competition and thus the scope for accommodating nominal exchange rate changes in mark-ups 
would diminish. Consequently, a stronger response in quantities exported to exchange rate 
changes would take place, which would have an implication for the assessment of exchange rate 
conditions: the same change in the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency appreciation) would 
lead to a stronger impact (restriction) on quantities exported under a more competitive external 
market than under a less competitive one.  
References: 
BETTS,  C. AND M.  DEVEROUX (2000): “Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Model of Pricing to 
Market”. Journal of International Economics, 50, 215–244. 
CHAMBERLIN, E. H. (1933): The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, M.A. 
CINCIBUCH, M. AND J. PODPIERA (2006): “Beyond Balassa–Samuelson: Real Appreciation in 
Tradables in Transition Countries”. Economics of Transition, 14(3), 547–573. 
DOMOWITZ,  I.,  R.  G.  HUBBARD, AND B.  C.  PETERSEN (1986): “Business Cycles and the 
Relationship between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins”. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, Vol 17, No.1, 1-17. 
GOLGBERG, P. K. AND M. M. KNETTER (1997): “Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What Have 
We Learned?” Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1243–1272. 
KNETTER,  M.  M. (1989): “Price Discrimination by U.S. and German Exporters”. American 
Economic Review, 79(1), 198–210. 
KNETTER, M. M. (1993): “International Comparisons of Price to Market Behavior”. American 
Economic Review, 83(3), 473–786. 
KRUGMAN, P. (1987): “Pricing-to-Market When the Exchange Rate Changes”. In Real Financial 
Linkages Among Open Economies. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 49–70. 
MAGNUS DATABASE (2006): Czech Capital Information Agency. Czech Republic. 
http://www.magnus.cz/?idf=databaze-magnus 
MARSTON,  R.  C. (1990): “Pricing-to-Market in Japanese Manufacturing”. Journal of 
International Economics, 29, 271–236. 
PANZAR, J. C. AND ROSSE, J. N. (1987): “Testing For ‘Monopoly’ Equilibrium”. The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 35(4), 443–456. 
SHAFFER,  S. (1983): “The Rosse-Panzar Statistic and the Lerner Index in the Short Run”. 










Table A-1: List of Companies in the Sample 









RUDOLF JELÍNEK a.s.  34  49971361  14% 15
STOCK Plzeň a.s.  6  14706563  5% 15
Pivovar Louny, a.s.  9  46708031  10% 15
VLNAP a.s.  17  13111  52% 17
DEKORA-Jeníček, a.s.  4  64829359  58% 17
Jitka, a.s.  33  13502905  70% 17
MILETA a.s.  32  45534403  72% 17
PERLA, bavlnářské závody,a.s.  16  60108908  73% 17
TIBA, a.s.  7  48171468  70% 17
VEBA, textilní závody a.s.  44  45534276  83% 17
HEDVA, a.s.  37  48171565  52% 17
VITKA Brněnec a.s.  14  174131  71% 17
JUTA, a.s.  22  45534187  72% 17
SLEZAN Frýdek-Místek a.s.  29  45193371  74% 17
Tylex Letovice, akciová společnost  24  13366  40% 17
LONKA Příbor, a.s.  10  18050913  70% 17
Triola a.s.  7  60192984  70% 18
TONAK a.s.  20  13226  79% 18
LIRA, obrazové lišty a rámy, a.s.  16  15789772  60% 20
OKD, PILA - SALMA, a.s.  4  47676230  23% 20
Biocel Paskov a.s.  7  26420317  90% 21
KRKONOŠSKÉ PAPÍRNY a.s.  15  45534284  37% 21
Olšanské papírny a.s.  35  12351  65% 21
Obchodní tiskárny, akciová společnost  33  13790  15% 22
SPOLANA a.s.  26  45147787  86% 24
Spolek pro chemickou a hutní výrobu, akciová společnost  17  11789  71% 24
ALIACHEM a.s.  20  60108916  43% 24
PRECHEZA a. s.  13  14617064  80% 24
BorsodChem MCHZ, s.r.o.  6  26019388  80% 24
Lovochemie, a.s.  20  49100262  37% 24
COLORLAK, a.s.  24  49444964  14% 24
BIOPHARM, Výzkumný ústav biofarmacie a veterinárních léčiv a.s.  22  46356606  59% 24
Zentiva a.s.  18  49240030  37% 24
Lybar, a.s.  8  49901869  55% 24
SILON a.s.  13  14504332  62% 24
RUBENA a.s.  7  12131  45% 25
VULKAN akciová společnost  29  12220  60% 25
GRANITOL, akciová společnost  15  12114  30% 25
Alfa Plastik, a.s.  5  60793791  40% 25
Chemoplast, a.s.  7  44015861  30% 25
Linaset, a.s.  6  47674687  45% 25
TANEX,PLASTY a.s.  6  13583808  70% 25
CRYSTALEX a.s.  6  49903501  90% 26
Sklo Bohemia, a.s.  14  48173371  85% 2618   Jiří Podpiera and Marie Raková  
 
Saint-Gobain Vertex, a.s.  33  12661  90% 26
Starorolský porcelán Moritz Zdekauer, a.s.  29  46886419  40% 26
Moravské keramické závody a.s.  9  46900985  56% 26
CIDEM Hranice, a.s.  4  14617081  22% 26
Průmysl kamene a.s.  5  46350888  50% 26
Mittal Steel Ostrava a.s.  11  45193258  34% 27
TŘINECKÉ ŽELEZÁRNY, a. s.  4  18050646  54.50% 27
V Á L C O V N Y  P L E C H U, a.s.  5  14613581  43% 27
ŽĎAS, a.s.  27  46347160  52% 27
Hutní druhovýroba - reality a.s.  16  46708715  33% 27
ŽDB a.s.  17  47672412  60% 27
Kovohutě Mníšek a.s.  6  45148112  66% 27
KOVOHUTĚ ROKYCANY, a.s.  4  49195719  50% 27
Pacovské strojírny, akciová společnost, Pacov , cizojazyčné mutace : Pacovské 
strojírny Aktiengesselschaft,Pacovské strojírny Sociéte Anonyme  29  15821773  70% 28
TENEZ a.s.  14  45534535  50% 28
Impress Znojmo, a.s.  5  46347054  50% 28
Šroubárna Turnov, a.s.  18  46504613  12% 28
Šroubárna Žatec, a.s.  13  49903527  65% 28
ŠKODA POWER s.r.o.  4  49193864  75% 29
JIHLAVAN, a.s.  19  46347071  38% 29
Poličské strojírny a.s.  32  46504851  69% 29
MSA, a.s.  40  45192278  90% 29
SEVEROČESKÁ ARMATURKA,a.s.  12  8885  29% 29
STROJÍRNY POLDI, spol. s r.o.  8  46358404  74% 29
Wikov MGI a.s.  23  529834  90% 29
Slovácké strojírny, akciová společnost  26  8702  88.60% 29
REMAK a.s.  8  15770397  60% 29
ZVVZ a.s.  40  9041  54% 29
TOS VARNSDORF a.s.  8  64651142  90% 29
OSTROJ a.s.  24  45193681  12% 29
STAVOSTROJ, a.s.  30  8753  90% 29
UNEX a.s.  8  45192049  65% 29
ADAMOVSKÉ STROJÍRNY a.s.  24  46345833  70% 29
BUZULUK Komárov, nástupnická a.s.  4  25056301  47% 29
KOBIT, spol. s r.o.  5  44792247  25% 29
Česká zbrojovka a.s.  46  46345965  80% 29
ETA a. s.  35  10341  70% 29
Isolit-Bravo, spol. s r.o.  4  46507272  80% 29
ATAS elektromotory Náchod a.s.  32  45534543  62% 31
OEZ s.r.o.  7  49810146  34% 31
KABLO ELEKTRO, a.s.  18  46504753  28% 31
MAGNETON a.s.  4  49969862  37% 31
ON SEMICONDUCTOR CZECH REPUBLIC, a.s.  20  45193533  70% 32
BMT a.s.  19  46346996  68% 33
DAEWOO AVIA, a.s.  6  45273227  50% 34
ŠKODA AUTO a.s.  12  177041  83% 34
TATRA, a.s.  6  45193444  78% 34
ALMET, a. s.  26  46505156  27% 34
MASSAG, a.s.  4  10367  30% 34
MOTORPAL,a.s.  15  9296  80% 34Degree of Competition and Export-Production Relative Prices when the Exchange Rate Changes   19 
 
Table A-2: Description of “OKEČ” – CPA2 
Classification  Description 
  15   Food products and beverages 
  17   Textiles 
  18   Wearing apparel; furs 
  19   Leather and leather products 
  20   Wood and products of wood and cork (except furniture) 
  21   Pulp, paper and paper products 
  22   Printed matter and recorded media 
  23   Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
  24   Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers 
  25   Rubber and plastic products 
  26   Other non metallic mineral products 
  27   Basic metals 
  28   Fabricated metal products, except for machinery and equipment 
  29   Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
  30   Office machinery and computers 
  31   Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
  32   Radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus 
  33   Medical, precision and optical instruments; watches, clocks 
  34   Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
  35   Other transport equipment 
  36   Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
 
Table A-3: Share of industry in total exports of manufactured goods – 2004  
Industry OKEČ  Share in manufacturing exports (%)  
Beer (food and beverages)  15 3.3 
Textiles  17;18 5.3 
Paper  20;21;22 5.2 
Chemicals  24;25 12.6 
Glass  26 4.4 
Metals  27;28 15.3 
Fitting  29 15.0 
Machines  31;32;33 20.3 
Cars  34 18.6 
Source: Czech Statistical Office and authors’ computations. 
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